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Abstract
Sensor nodes are resource-constrained, such as low battery life, computation, bandwidth and memory, so traditional
public key schemes are impractical in wireless sensor networks. In the previous schemes, symmetric cryptography is
the most common method used in sensor nodes. How to distribute keys into every sensor node is an important issue
in many applications for hierarchical sensor networks. Once adversaries compromise a sensor node, they can obtain
all information from the sensor’s memory, such as keying material. The revocation of compromised sensor nodes is
also a necessary but troublesome operation. These compromised sensor nodes may lead to the compromise of the
entire network. In this article, we present an eﬃcient approach to establish security links between each sensor
node/cluster head and its neighbor/member. Our scheme only requires small memory size for each cluster head and
sensor node, and it can also ensure perfect forward secrecy via changing session key in every transmission.
Keywords: Wireless sensor network, Key management, Perfect forward secrecy.
Introduction
In recent years, wireless sensor network is an impor-
tant issue in many applications, such as military intrusion
detection, habitat monitoring, and so on. Sensor nodes
are often deployed in unattended environments, so the
security design is vital in many sensitive applications. The
security mechanisms for wireless sensor networks have to
provide authentication, conﬁdentiality, integrity, scalabil-
ity, and ﬂexibility. Sensor nodes can sense and forward the
readings to the base station (or sink), so the secure com-
munication among sensor nodes is one of many important
security issues in the sensor networks for the purpose of
avoiding being eavesdropped or injected bogus data by
adversaries. Many studies in the previous researches have
been in the security issues, and key management has been
a popular research so far [1-8].
Traditional asymmetric schemes such as public-key
techniques are not suitable for the resource-constrained
sensor nodes, which are characterized by limitedmemory,
computation, communication, and power. There are many
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variations of symmetric key schemes [9-11] used in the
certiﬁcate authentication, and veriﬁcation of a broadcast
message. These variations are suitable for sensor nodes
because they use the delay disclosure key that is actu-
ally used in a symmetric scheme for authentication and
veriﬁcation.
The pairwise key establishment between any two neigh-
boring nodes is the main objective. Each sensor node can
communicate with each neighboring sensor node using
the pairwise key they shared. Eschenauer and Gligor [7]
proposed a well-known key management scheme called
basic scheme. In the key predistribution phase, a large
pool of P keys and their key identiﬁers are generated. Each
sensor node randomly selects k keys from the key pool P
without replacement. In the shared-key discovery phase,
any two neighboring sensor nodes can ﬁnd out if they
share (at least) a common key via exchanging the list of
key identiﬁers on their key rings or using a challenge-
response protocol. If any two neighboring nodes can not
ﬁnd out a common key on their key rings, they can per-
form path-key establishment if the graph is connected.
Chan et al. [1] proposed three schemes called q-composite
random key predistribution, multipath key reinforcement
and random-pairwise keys scheme, respectively. The ﬁrst
and second schemes are the modiﬁcations of the basic
scheme [7]. The q-composite random key predistribution
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scheme requires that any two neighboring sensor nodes
need to share at least q (q > 1) keys for their link in
order to increase the resilience against sensor node com-
promise. The multipath key reinforcement scheme can
strengthen any link between any two neighboring sensor
nodes that shared a single key via updating the commu-
nication key if enough routing information of them can
be exchanged. The random-pairwise keys scheme oﬀers
the perfect resistance against node capture and node-
to-node authentication. These schemes are all based on
probabilistic shared keys.
Perrig et al. [11] proposed two protocols called
SNEP and μTESLA, respectively. SNEP uses a counter
to achieve semantic security without transmitting the
counter value. μTESLA employs a one-way key chain for
the authentication of broadcast messages, and it is an
important issue in wireless sensor networks. In [10], Liu
and Ning proposed a variation of μTESLA called Multi-
level μTESLA. This scheme improves the communication
overhead, tolerance of message loss, scalability, resistance
to replay attacks, and DOS attacks.
Heinzelman et al. [12] proposed a self-organizing clus-
tering protocol called LEACH. This scheme can aver-
age energy consumption in homogenous wireless sensor
networks. Each sensor node decides whether or not to
become a cluster head during diﬀerent cluster rounds.
Hsieh et al. [9] proposed an adaptive security design based
on LEACH, and they also used proposed intrusion detec-
tion module to detect the compromised cluster heads or
sensor nodes by evaluating trust value. Oliveiraa et al. [13]
proposed a scheme called SecLEACH to add security to
LEACH. They used a random key predistribution scheme
proposed in [7] to bootstrap security in LEACH.
Huan et al. [14,15] proposed the access control proto-
cols in wireless sensor networks. They used ECC-based
cryptography for sensor node authentication and pairwise
key establishment. Any two neighboring sensor nodes can
establish a pairwise key if each one is authentic. Zhu et al.
[16] proposed a key management protocol called LEAP+
for sensor networks. They assumed that an adversary can
not compromise a sensor node within a time intervalTmin.
This scheme can also establish pairwise key between any
two neighboring sensor nodes via exchanging their own
identity. Suppose node x is a new deployed sensor node,
and node y is a neighboring sensor node of node x, then
they can establish pairwise key Kxy after neighbor discov-
ery. If adversaries compromise node x, they do not have
method to establish pairwise key with other sensor nodes
by manipulating node x.
In ID-based cryptography [17], a user’s ID is just like
the user’s public key. An ID-based signature scheme called
BNN-IBS can be found in [18]. BNN-IBS is based on
Schnorr signature [19], and this scheme can be eﬃ-
ciently used in wireless sensor networks without much
computation overhead. Recently, Cao et al. [20] proposed
a variation of BNN-IBS called vBNN-IBS with a smaller
signature size. The schemes in [21,22] are the similar to
ID-based cryptography.
In this article, we propose a secure communication
scheme among nodes through preloading each node with
a unique and private seed for a hierarchical (heteroge-
neous) sensor network. This scheme can achieve secure
unicast, multicast, and local broadcast using the private
seed which each sensor node possesses. When a cluster
head is compromised by an adversary, we can redistribute
the sensor nodes of this cluster into new cluster heads.
Because each cluster head does not have the private seeds
which its members posses, we can eliminate any compro-
mised cluster head easily. Furthermore, our scheme can
minimize the storage overhead of each sensor node by
preloading each sensor node with one private seed only.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section
“Related works”, we introduce related work. We present
the background knowledge used in this article in Section
“Preliminaries”. In Section “The proposed method”, we
present our proposed method. Section “Security analy-
sis” is the security analysis. Section “Performance evalua-
tions” is the performance evaluation. The conclusion is in
Section “Conclusion”.
Related works
Du et al. [5] proposed a key management scheme for het-
erogeneous or hierarchical sensor networks. A large key
pool and the corresponding key IDs are generated at the
beginning. Each L-sensor is loaded with l keys, and each
H-sensor (e.g., cluster head) is loaded with M (M  l)
keys without replacement from the key pool. When the
key predistribution phase is ﬁnished, the shared-key dis-
covery phase is performed by each L-sensor andH-sensor
for ﬁnding the pairwise key between any two nodes. In this
article, we use the clustering method used in [5] to form
clusters in the sensor networks. Du et al. [3,4] proposed a
scalable and ﬂexible pairwise key predistribution scheme.
This scheme is more resilient against node capture than
previous schemes.
In hierarchical sensor networks, exclusion basis system
(EBS) applies a set of administrative keys to each sensor
node [6]. The key management scheme is deﬁned as EBS
(n, k, m), where n is the number of the sensor nodes in
the EBS, k is the number of administrative keys assigned
to each sensor node, and m is the number of adminis-
trative keys not assigned to each sensor node. The total
number of administrative keys is k +m. Each sensor node
holds a unique subset of administrative keys. Chorzempa
et al. [2] employed the EBS in their scheme, called SECK
in hierarchical sensor networks. SECK is a cluster-based
dynamic key management scheme. When one or more
sensor nodes are compromised by adversaries, it has to
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rekey by AFN (i.e., cluster head). Once an AFN is lost
or captured, each sensor node within the same cluster
has to re-cluster, which is triggered by a trusted third
party (TTP) (e.g., base station). SECK is resilient to sensor
nodes and key captures. Our scheme is similar to SECK,
each cluster is also controlled by the corresponding clus-
ter head which stores some secret information, e.g., keys.
Younis et al. [8] proposed a novel keymanagement scheme
called SHELL based on EBS [6] in clustered sensor net-
works. Command Node (e.g., sink or Base Station) desig-
nates for each cluster a number of key generating gateways
(e.g., cluster head), so SHELL is more resilient against
gateway compromise. They proposed a novel approach
for administrative keys assignment in each cluster. The
heuristic key assignment algorithm can eﬃciently resist
the collusion attacks since each pair has the smallest Ham-
ming distance between any two neighboring sensor nodes
when assigning a subset of administrative keys to each
sensor node.
In [21,23,24], the authors proposed several localization
schemes. In this article, we assume that each sensor node
can estimate its location by these localization schemes.
We also assume that an adversary can not launch an
eﬃcient attack to aﬀect the localization performance. In
other words, each sensor node can estimate its location
correctly.
Chang et al. [25] proposed a dynamic multicast commu-
nications scheme. In this article, we use this scheme for a
secure multicast communication between any two neigh-
boring sensor nodes. We introduce our network model
and the scheme [25] in the next section.
Preliminaries
In this section, we brieﬂy introduce our network architec-
ture and the scheme in [25] called broadcast-encryption-
based key management scheme as follows.
The network model
We present the hierarchical sensor network model in this
section. The sensor network is composed of a base sta-
tion, a small quantity of resource-rich cluster heads, and
a large quantity of resource-constrained sensor nodes.
Base station and cluster heads have more powerful energy,
memory, and processing ability, but sensor nodes do not.
The sensor nodes of a cluster gather information from the
operational environment and send their readings to the
cluster head. Then the cluster head collects the readings of
these sensor nodes, and send them to the base station. We
assume that even though all cluster heads are equipped
with tamper-resistant hardware, they may be still compro-
mised by adversaries. All sensor nodes are not equipped
with tamper-resistant hardware because of the high cost.
Cluster heads and sensor nodes are stationary, and sen-
sor nodes may be distributed by airdropping or other
methods. So we do not have any deployment knowledge
about each sensor node. In other words, there is no way
to know the neighbors of one sensor node in advance. We
assume that each cluster head is reachable to all its mem-
bers in its cluster, and each sensor node can communicate
with its cluster head via one-hop or multi-hop transmis-
sion paths. The physical location of all sensor nodes and
cluster heads are known [8]. In other words, all sensor
nodes and cluster heads can be aware of their own location
using the previous schemes such as [21,23,24]. Figure 1
shows that the hierarchical sensor network model used in
this article.
The broadcast-encryption-based key management scheme
Chang et al. [25] proposed a broadcast scheme for secure
multicast. We assume that the number of the broad-
cast group members is n, and U denotes the broadcast
group, where U = {u1,u2, . . . ,un}. Um denotes a multi-
cast group, Um ∈ U . For example, Um can be {u1,u3}.
An encryption algorithm denoted E(∗) is known to each
one with a l-bits key. EK (M) denotes that a message M is
encrypted with a l-bits key K. H(∗) is an one-way hash
function with an output of a ﬁxed length l-bits. ‖ is a
concatenation which can concatenate two or more strings
together. We assume that the members u1,u2, . . . ,un have
the seeds su1 , su2 , . . . , sun in advance. First, the sender
selects a prime ps arbitrarily from p1, p2, . . . , pn, a ran-
dom number X, and a random secret key K. Second,
the sender determines Um and broadcasts {B,X,EK (M)},






Figure 1 The hierarchical sensor network model.
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receives {B,X,EK (M)}, he can obtain K via computing the
following equation:
K = B mod H(sui‖X).
Note that the session key K should necessarily satisfy:
2l−1 < K < min{H(sui‖X)‖ui ∈ Um} ≤ 2l.
Finally, ux is able to decrypt and get secret message M.
Each sender can choose a random secret key K and ran-
dom number X if they want to multicast secret messages
in their group.
The adversary model and threat model
Adversaries are able to compromise (or capture) one or
more sensor nodes (or cluster head) in wireless sensor
networks. Then all the secret information (e.g., all key
material, or data) held by the sensor node (or the cluster
head) is known to the adversaries. Once adversaries obtain
the secret keys from the compromised sensor nodes (or
the cluster head), they may manipulate or attack the sen-
sor network. We also assume that adversaries do not have
any prior knowledge of what is stored in each sensor
node [8]. In the previous scheme [2,5], once the adver-
saries compromise a cluster head, all the secret keys held
by the cluster head in that cluster will be compromised.
But our proposed scheme can prevent this situation from
compromising all the keys in that cluster because each
cluster head does not possess the private seeds held by
its members. If an adversary compromises a cluster head,
the sensor nodes in that cluster has to be re-clustered
into new clusters and establish new security relationships
among them. The adversary can also compromise a sen-
sor node, and then the cluster head in that cluster has to
revoke the compromised sensor node without the opera-




In this section, we describe our scheme designed for hier-
archical sensor networks. Our scheme applies the location
information to deploy the sensor nodes and cluster heads.
The advantages of using location information are to pre-
vent from replication attack, sybil attack, and wormhole
attack. The detailed steps of our scheme are introduced in
the following section.
The setup phase
Before sensor nodes and cluster heads are deployed, a
TTP, e.g., the sensor networks controller or the base sta-
tion, decides the system parameters such as a symmetric
encryption algorithm E(∗) with a l-bit key, an one-way
hash functionH(∗)with a ﬁxed l-bit output.We denote an
ordinary sensor and a cluster head as Ni and CHj, respec-
tively. The base station preloads each sensor node Ni with
two parameters including a unique identity IDNi and a
seed SNi which is unique and private. For each cluster head
CHj, the base station also preloads it with a unique iden-
tity IDCHj , a unique and private seed SCHj , and another
seed S′BS, where S′BS = H(SBS‖IDCHj); ‖ is the operation
of concatenation. Note that the base station has all private
seeds of each cluster head and sensor node, i.e., SNi , SCHj ,
and its own private seed SBS which is only known to itself.
The cluster head registration phase
After the setup phase is ﬁnished, all sensor nodes and
cluster heads are uniformly and randomly deployed into
a ﬂat network that is a designated area. Cluster head CHj
has to inform the base station of its ID and location. The
base station can authenticate the validity of each cluster
head using the preloaded S′BS in each cluster head. CHj
randomly chooses a prime RPCHj , a number XCHj , and
a session key KCHj . Note that the session key KCHj has
to be larger than RPCHj for the purpose of reducing the
probability to illegally derive KCHj . Then CHj sends the
following message to the base station:
IDCHj , LocationCHj ,B,XCHj ,EKCHj (IDCHj‖LocationCHj),
where B = (RPCHj × H(S′BS‖XCHj)) + KCHj . After receiv-
ing the messages from each cluster head, the base station
is able to compute S′BS = H(SBS‖IDCHj), and then it can
obtain KCHj via computing the following equation:
KCHj = B mod H(S′BS‖XCHj).
If S′BS hold by cluster head CHj is correct, the base station
is able to decrypt EKCHj (IDCHj‖LocationCHj) with KCHj ,
and transmits the seeds of other cluster heads encrypted
with the key KCHj , e.g., S′CHm (CHm represents other clus-
ter heads, S′CHm =H(SCHm‖IDCHj), and j =m), to the clus-
ter head CHj for communications among cluster heads.
The clustering phase
Each cluster head broadcasts a hello message that con-
tains (IDCHj , LocationCHj) to nearby sensor nodes using
the maximum power with a random delay that can avoid
the collision of hellomessages [5], where LocationCHj rep-
resents the CHj’s location. If two or more cluster heads are
available for sensor node Ni, it chooses the cluster head,
denoted as chi, whose hellomessage has the strongest sig-
nal to become a member of the cluster controlled by chi.
Note that we assume that a suﬃcient number of cluster
heads are deployed, so most sensor nodes in the sensor
network can receive the hellomessage(s) from at least one
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or more cluster heads. Finally, each cluster is controlled
by a cluster head. This clustering scheme is similar to the
schemes used in [5] or [9].
The sensor node join phase
After the clustering phase, each sensor node has to join
the most appropriate cluster for itself. Suppose that sen-
sor node Ni wants to join the cluster controlled by cluster
head chi, it sends a joinmessage:
(IDNi ,LocationNi ,TSNi , IDchi ,
H(SNi‖IDNi‖IDchi‖LocationNi‖TSNi)),
where TSNi is the timestamp, to the cluster head chi for
the purpose of becoming a member in this cluster. When
the cluster head chi receives all join messages from its
members which want to join its cluster, it has to send a
request message to the base station for the purpose of
obtaining the seeds of its members. First, chi randomly
chooses a prime RPchi , a number Xchi , and a session key
Kchi . Note that these parameters RPchi , Xchi , and Kchi
can vary in every transmission. After cluster heads or
sensor nodes use these parameters, they will erase these
parameters from their ownmemory immediately. Second,
chi sends the request message to the base station. This
message is described as follows:
IDchi ,IDBS,B,Xchi ,EKchi (. . . ‖ < IDNi , LocationNi ,TSNi ,
H(SNi‖IDNi‖IDchi‖LocationNi‖TSNi) > ‖ . . . ),
where B = (RPchi × H(S′BS‖Xchi)) + Kchi . After receiv-
ing this message, the base station ﬁrst computes S′BS =
H(SBS‖IDchi), and then it can obtain Kchi via computing
the following equation:
Kchi = B mod H(S′BS‖Xchi).
After obtaining Kchi, the base station is able to decrypt
the message:
EKchi( . . . ‖ < IDNi , LocationNi ,TSNi ,
H(SNi‖IDNi‖IDchi‖LocationNi‖TSNi) > ‖ . . . ).
Because the base station knows all private seeds pre-
deployed in each sensor node, it can check if these hash
values are equal to the values it computes. If any com-
puted hash value diﬀers from the original one, the base
station will reject the message. The base station then col-
lects the IDs and locations of sensor nodes, and tabulates
each sensor node’s ID and location over every cluster.
Then the base station searches the corresponding seed
SNi if sensor nodeNi is legitimate, and sends the following
message to chi:
IDBS, IDchi ,EKchi (. . . ‖ < IDNi , S′Ni > ‖ . . . ),
where S′Ni = H(SNi‖IDchi‖Locationchi). After receiving
this message from the base station, chi can decrypt this
message and obtain the seeds of its members, i.e. S′Ni , in
this cluster controlled by chi. Finally, chi can tabulate each
sensor node’s ID, location, and S′Ni in this cluster. Note that
S′Ni is not the private seed SNi possessed by Ni.
The sensor node discovery phase
All sensor nodes are unaware of their neighboring sensor
nodes until they have been deployed. We do not have any
deployment knowledge. First, sensor node Ni tries to ﬁnd
its one-hop neighboring sensor nodes within its transmis-
sion range, so it broadcasts a hello message that contains
its (IDNi , LocationNi , IDchi) to its one-hop neighboring
sensor nodes. We recall that chi is the cluster head that Ni
belongs to. If the cluster head ID of one of Ni’s neighbors,
say Nk , is the same as Ni’s cluster head ID, Nk will send
a reply message that includes its (IDNk , LocationNk , IDchi)
to Ni. Note that Nk will includes cluster head chi if chi is
within Ni’s transmission range. Then, sensor node Ni can
collect all reply messages from its one-hop neighboring
sensor nodes whose cluster head ID is the same as its in
this cluster controlled by chi. This step can be described
as follows:
Ni → ∗ : hello(IDNi , LocationNi , IDchi).
Nk → Ni : reply(IDNk , LocationNk , IDchi).
Upon receipt of this message, Ni checks if the loca-
tions of its neighbors are within its transmission range.
If it is true, Ni sends a request message that contains
(IDN1 , IDN2 , . . . , IDNk ) to chi for the purpose of obtaining
the seeds of its one-hop neighboring sensor nodes, i.e.,
S′′Nk . This request message do not have to be encrypted.
Each sensor node sends this message to its cluster head
via one-hop or multi-hop transmission path through mul-
tiple sensor nodes. We recall that the request message
may include cluster head chi if it is within sensor node
Ni’s transmission range. chi waits for each member in this
cluster to send the request message. After collecting all
request messages from each one of its members, chi has
to unicast a message that includes the seeds of Ni’s neigh-
bors to Ni. chi randomly chooses a prime RPchi , a number
Xchi , and a session key Kchi . This message is described as
follows:
IDchi , Locationchi , IDNi ,B,Xchi ,
EKchi (< IDN1 , S
′′
N1 >‖< IDN2 , S′′N2 >‖. . . ,< IDNk , S′′Nk >),
where B = (RPchi × H(S′Ni‖Xchi)) + Kchi , and S′′Nk =
H(S′Nk‖IDNi‖LocationNi). After receiving this message,Ni
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ﬁrst computes S′Ni = H(SNi‖IDchi‖Locationchi), and then
it can obtain Kchi via computing the following equation:
Kchi = B mod H(S′Ni‖Xchi).
Ni can decrypt this message and obtain the seeds of its
neighbors, i.e., S′′Nk . Each sensor node can use this method
to obtain the seeds of its neighboring sensor nodes for
securely communicating with them. Note that if Ni do
not send a joinmessage to the corresponding cluster head
chi for becoming a member of the cluster in advance, chi
will reject its request message once Ni wants to obtain the
seeds of its neighbors.
The secure communication phase
Once the sensor node discovery phase is ﬁnished,
each sensor node/cluster head can securely broad-
cast/multicast data to its neighbors/members using the
seeds of its neighbors/members. For example, sensor node
Ni wants to broadcast/multicast data M to its neigh-
bors, e.g., Nk . First, Ni randomly chooses a prime RPNi ,
a number XNi , and a session key KNi . These steps are
like the method mentioned before. Second, a multicast
group Um = {N1,N2, . . . ,Nk} is decided by Ni. This
broadcasting message can be explained as follows:
IDNi , locationNi ,B,XNi ,EKNi (M),




Nk‖XNi)) + KNi . After re-
ceiving this message, Nk ﬁrst computes S′′Nk = H(S′Nk‖
IDNi‖LocationNi), where S′Nk = H(SNk‖IDchi‖Loca-
tionchi). Then Nk can obtain KNi via computing the fol-
lowing equation:
KNi = B mod H(S′′Nk‖XNi).
After obtaining KNi , Nk can decrypt this message and
obtain M. Ni can communicate with one or more neigh-
boring sensor nodes in the same manner.
Re-clustering after cluster head capture/compromise
Every cluster head may be compromised or captured in
the sensor network by adversaries. The sensor nodes that
belong to a compromised cluster head have to be redis-
tributed into new cluster heads. We assume that there
is an appropriate intrusion detection system (IDS) used
at the base station and cluster heads. The base station
can monitor all cluster heads, and each cluster head can
also monitor all its members in its cluster. If any clus-
ter head (or sensor node) is compromised, then failure
can be detected by the base station (or cluster heads).
This assumption is similar to the [2,8]. In this section, we
describe the re-clustering scheme step by step. For exam-
ple, adversaries compromises a cluster head, denoted as
chc, and obtains all secret information from chc, e.g., the
seeds S′Ni of its members, in this cluster. All the members
of this cluster controlled by chc have to be redistributed
into new cluster heads. Once the compromised chc is
detected by the base station, the base station has to revoke
chc. First, the base station records the sensor nodes of this
cluster as a listc, say orphaned sensor nodes [8]. Second,
the base station randomly chooses a prime RPBS, a num-
ber XBS, and a session key KBS. Third, it has to announce
the compromised ID and location of chc via sending the
following message to all legal cluster heads CHj in the
sensor network:
IDBS,B,XBS,EKBS(event{IDchc , Locationchc , re-clustering}),
where B = (RPBS∏CHj∈Um H(S′CHj‖XBS)) + KBS, and
S′CHj = H(SCHj‖IDBS). After receiving this message, CHj
can decrypt it and knows which cluster head is compro-
mised by adversaries. If CHj (one or more) is located
around chc, it will rebroadcast a re-clustering mes-
sage that contains (< IDCHj , LocationCHj >,< IDchc ,
Locationchc >) to nearby sensor nodes using the maxi-
mum power with a random delay for redistributing the
sensor nodes that belong to chc into new cluster heads.
If a sensor node which receives many re-clustering mes-
sages belongs to chc, it will need to choose a new cluster
head whose re-clustering message has the strongest sig-
nal to join the cluster. The following steps are similar to
the sensor node join phase and the sensor node discov-
ery phase as mentioned before. Note that the listc stored
in the base station can prevent the false or illegal sensor
nodes from joining new clusters during the sensor node
join phase. In our re-clustering scheme, chc do not possess
the private seeds which its members possess. The base
station only needs to regenerate the corresponding seeds,
i.e., S′Ni = H(SNi‖IDCHj), and sends them to CHj that is
located around chc. The compromise of the cluster head
chc can not cause the entire compromise of its cluster.
Revocation after sensor node capture/compromise
When a sensor node, say Nc, is compromised by an adver-
sary, the corresponding cluster head, say ch, has to revoke
Nc for avoiding the compromise of future messages. In
other words, cluster head ch has to inform its members
of the compromise of Nc via broadcasting the following
message:
IDch, Locationch,B,Xch,EKch(IDNc‖LocationNc),
where B = (RPch∏Ni∈Um H(S′Ni‖Xch))+Kch. After receiv-
ing this message, the members of the cluster controlled
by ch can decrypt it and know the compromised sensor
node’s ID and location. If a sensor node is one ofNc’ neigh-
bors, say Nk , it has to remove the corresponding seed, i.e.,
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S′′Nc , and update the relation with the compromised sensor
nodeNc. Note that the compromised sensor nodeNc does
not possess the private seeds of its neighbors Nk , i.e., SNk ,
and it only possesses the given seeds of its neighbors from
ch, i.e., S′′Nk = H(S′Nk‖IDNc‖LocationNc).Nk can revokeNc
by memorizing the revoked IDNc only.
Adding new sensor nodes
Sensor nodes may be compromised or exhaust their bat-
teries, so adding new sensor nodes is a critical issue after
some running or operation time. Each new sensor node is
preloaded with two parameters: (IDnew, Snew), an encryp-
tion algorithm E(∗), and an one-way hash function H(∗).
After new sensor nodes are randomly deployed, they have
to be distributed into new cluster heads. The base sta-
tion asks each cluster head to rebroadcast a hellomessage
for clustering. The follow-up processes are similar to the
clustering phase, the sensor node join phase, and the sen-
sor node discovery phase. Note that old sensor nodes may
receive hello message(s) from one or more cluster heads,
they will ignore the message(s). We also assume, like the
scheme [16], that the hello messages broadcast of sen-
sor nodes is performed during the sensor node discovery
phase wherein all sensor nodes are free from compro-
mise. Each sensor node can ﬁnish the discovery phase
successfully in the process.
Security analysis
Eavesdropping and injection attack
Our proposed method can prevent external adversaries
from eavesdropping normal messages or injecting bogus
data into the sensor network. Because adversaries do not
have the corresponding seeds of sensor nodes, they can
not decrypt messages or impersonate a legitimate sensor
node to forge messages for disrupting the sensor network.
Sensor node replication attack
Adversaries can deploy malicious sensor nodes which are
clones of a compromised sensor node, say A, into multiple
locations in the sensor network. There are two scenarios.
The ﬁrst scenario is that a clone is deployed at one loca-
tion distant from A’s original location in the same cluster
as A. This will be detected by the corresponding clus-
ter head if the clone sends a join message to the cluster
head. The second scenario is that a clone is deployed in
the diﬀerent cluster from A. The base station can be aware
of which cluster the clone wants to join during the sen-
sor node join phase because it knows each member’s ID
and the corresponding location of each cluster if A has
joined a cluster at one location before. Once the base sta-
tion knows that the clone of a compromised sensor node
may be deployed in the vicinity of a certain cluster head, it
can reject the clone’s joinmessage. Therefore, the base sta-
tion can make a judgment that A is a compromised sensor
node and then takes the appropriate action in order to
revoke A.
Sybil attack
Newsome et al. [26] and Zhou et al. [15] were introduced
the Sybil attack. In this attack, a malicious sensor node
claims multiple IDs or locations. Suppose that a malicious
sensor node, say A, impersonates a legitimate or illegit-
imate sensor node, say B. The malicious sensor node A
looks like a new deployed sensor node B from the view
of the sensor nodes in the vicinity of A. Sybil attack may
lead to many serious eﬀects in sensor network, e.g., incon-
sistence of the network routing information [22]. Our
scheme can defense against Sybil attack because the mali-
cious sensor node A do not possess the corresponding
private seed of B. Thus, the malicious sensor node can not
successfully impersonate other nodes to inject forged data
or routing information into the sensor network without
the corresponding private seeds.
Wormhole attack
In the Wormhole attack, adversaries try to tunnel nor-
mal messages between two distinct locations by creating
an out-of-band and low-latency channel [15,21,22,27,28].
This attack does not compromise any sensor node, but
it may lead to many serious threats, e.g., the chaos of
the routing operations [22]. In our scheme, suppose that
the channel between two far sensor nodes (they are not
neighbors) C and D is created by adversaries in a cluster.
A legitimate sensor node, say C, receives a reply mes-
sage from another sensor node, say D, during the sensor
node discovery phase, and it can check if the location
of D is within its transmission range. If D is not within
C’s transmission range, C will conﬁrm that D is not one
of its neighbors. In another situation, when C receives a
message sent from D during The Secure Communication
Phase, it can also check if the location of D is within its
transmission. If D is not within C’s transmission range, C
will reject the message sent from D. Assuming that adver-
saries forge the location ofD to be within C’s transmission
range,C can not decrypt the message sent fromD because
C will use the location ofD to compute the corresponding
seed, i.e., S′′C = H(S′C‖IDD‖LocationD) in order to obtain
the session key KD via computing the equation KND =
B mod H(S′′NC‖XND). Because the location of D is fake, C
can not decrypt the message sent fromD correctly. There-
fore, our scheme can defense against Wormhole attack
according to locations. Note that if a malicious sensor
node forges its location to communicate with other sensor
nodes, in all probability, it will be detected by its neigh-
boring sensor nodes (or cluster head) which have its ID
and location. Once the neighbors of the malicious sen-
sor node detect the abnormality of it, they will notify the
corresponding cluster head of the event.
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Sinkhole attack
The authors in [21,28] pointed out that the Sinkhole
attack is a serious attack to wireless sensor network rout-
ing protocols. In this attack, compromised or malicious
sensor nodes try to attract all the messages from their
neighbors by tricking other sensor nodes [21]. In other
words, a compromised or malicious sensor node wants to
become a relay node for attracting all the messages sent by
legitimate sensor nodes. Under such attack, our scheme
can withstand Sinkhole attack via checking whether the
distance between two locations is within the reasonable
transmission range or not. With our scheme, the location
information advertisements of neighbors of each sensor
node can be authenticated. Assuming that a compromised
sensor node forges its own location to trick other sensor
nodes, in all probability, this attack will be detected by its
neighbors (or cluster head) as the mentioned before.
Perfect forward secrecy
Du et al. [5] used a broadcast key in order to securely
broadcast messages among neighboring sensor nodes. In
addition, the authors in the previous schemes [2,8] used
a communication (or session) key for communications
among the sensor nodes in the same cluster. This will
causes a problem that once adversaries compromise a
sensor node of one cluster, the former messages inter-
cepted and collected from the sensor node by adversaries
can be decrypted using the communication key of the
compromised one. However, our scheme can withstand
such situation via changing the session key every time.
We recall that after cluster heads or sensor nodes use
the parameters, e.g., RP, X, and K, they will erase these
parameters from their own memory immediately. This
characteristic will ensures that our scheme can achieve
perfect forward secrecy. For example, we assume that an
adversary has intercepted and collected all messages from
a compromised sensor node, say E. The adversary can not
decrypt these messages via using the keying material of
E. Furthermore, our scheme has another advantage. Once
a sensor node is compromised, other legal sensor nodes
have to remove the compromised keys in the previous
scheme [2,5,8], but we do not need to do so. In Table 1, we
compare our scheme with [2,5].
Performance evaluations
Storage overhead
Each cluster head has to store the seeds, IDs and locations
of all its members in order to securely broadcast messages
Table 1 Comparison of perfect forward secrecy for three
schemes
AP[5] SECK[2] Our scheme
Perfect forward secrecy No No Yes
to its members. Because cluster heads are resource-rich,
this storage overhead is acceptable for them. Each sensor
node also has to store the seeds, IDs and locations of all
its neighbors. Because the communication range of each
sensor node is limited, the number of these neighbors is
also restricted.
For simplicity, we only discuss the required keys for
a sensor node in this section. In our proposed method,
each sensor node Ni has to store its own private seed, e.g.
SNi , and the seeds of its neighboring sensor nodes, e.g.
S′′Nk . The number of a sensor node’s neighbors depends
on the network density. Suppose that a sensor node wants
to communicate with its n neighbors, and then the sen-
sor node has to store n seeds of its neighbors in order
to securely broadcast/multicast messages. We make a
comparison with the previous schemes [2,5] used in a
hierarchical sensor network in terms of the required keys.
Du et al. [5] proposed an asymmetric predistribution
key management scheme (AP). We recall that a large
key pool and the corresponding key IDs are generated at
the beginning, and each L-sensor is loaded with l keys,
and each H-sensor (e.g., cluster head) is loaded with
M(M  l) keys without replacement from the key pool.
Each sensor node also can set up broadcast keys in order
to securely broadcast messages to its neighbors. Assum-
ing that the number of neighbors of a sensor node is n,
the sensor node will have to store n + 1 broadcast keys in
its memory.
Chorzempa et al. [2], the authors proposed the SECK.
Prior to deployment, each sensor node has to store the
complete administrative keys {Ka1 ,Ka2 , . . . ,Kak+m} and a
pairwise secret key Kpi shared with the base station. After
deployment, each sensor node is required to store only
a subset of the administrative keys {Ka1 ,Ka2 , . . . ,Kak+m},
i.e., k keys, and one tree administrative key Kti assigned
by its AFN (cluster head). Table 2 oﬀers a view of storage
overhead for three schemes.
Communication overhead
Mica2 motes are widely used in wireless sensor networks,
and we use the following consumption rates [29]: 16.25
and 12.25μJ/byte for transmission and reception toMica2
motes, respectively. We also assume that ID, location and
X are 2, 2, and 8 bytes, respectively. The communication
overhead of the sensor node discovery phase is evalu-
ated using the assumptions mentioned above. This phase
Table 2 Comparison of storage overhead for three
schemes in terms of the number of keys stored in each
sensor node
AP[5] SECK[2] Our scheme
Prior to deployment l k + m + 1 1
After deployment l + n + 1 k + 2 n + 1
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incurs the following communication cost. We recall that
when a sensor node Ni tries to ﬁnd its one-hop neigh-
bors within its transmission range, it broadcasts a hello
message that contains its (IDNi , LocationNi , IDchi), which
is 6 bytes, to its one-hop neighbors. The energy con-
sumption of the payload for transmission and reception
is 97.5 and 73.5μJ, respectively. Assuming that a sen-
sor node has n neighbors, its communication overhead is
(97.5+73.5n)μJ. This time complexity of communication
overhead is O(n) according to the number of neighbors of
one sensor node.
In the following, we evaluate the communication over-
head of one sensor node according to the number
of a multicast group during the secure communica-
tion phase. This communication overhead of broadcast-
ing/multicasting messages depends on the size of a mul-
ticast group Um. In our scheme, the additional commu-
nication cost of transmission and reception is acceptable
for resource-constrained sensor nodes during the secure
communication phase because the number of neighbors
of every sensor node is limited by small transmission
range. For example, assuming that sensor node Ni wants
to broadcast/multicast data M to its neighbors as the
mentioned in Section “The proposed method”, it has to
send the following message: IDNi , locationNi , B, XNi ,
and EKNi (M). The bigger the quantity of Um of sen-





Nk‖XNi))+KNi . The time complexity of
B is O(n2) according to the number of neighbors of one
sensor node.
Computation overhead
In our scheme, we do not employ any public key tech-
nique for communications among nodes, instead we use
symmetric cryptography, multiplication and mod oper-
ations to encrypt/decrypt data and compute B and
K, respectively. These operations are not a big com-
putation overhead used in resource-constrained sensor
nodes. Assuming that sender Ni transmits a message
(IDNi , locationNi ,B,XNi ,EKNi (M)), in which B is com-
puted byNi using multiplication operation, to receiverNk ,
and then the receiver Nk can obtain KNi from the mes-
sage sent by sender Ni using mod operation to compute
the following equation: KNi = B mod H(S′′Nk‖XNi). After
obtaining KNi , the receiver can use this key KNi to decrypt
themessage via the symmetric cryptography which is suit-
able for resource-constrained sensor nodes. We evaluate
energy cost of symmetric-key and hash algorithms using
[30]. We use the following assumption rates: 1.62/2.49
μJ/byte and 5.9 μJ/byte for AES with 128-bit keys for data
encryption/decryption and SHA-1 for hashing, respec-
tively. The energy cost of encrypting/decrypting a 20
bytes data and hashing a 136 bytes data are 32.4/49.8
μJ and 802.4 μJ, respectively. As reported in [14], the
modular inverse computation and modular exponentia-
tion operation are the most time-consuming operations.
Therefore, our scheme do not use these two operations,
and we only use the multiplication and mod operations
for sensor nodes.
Conclusion
We propose a secure broadcast/multicast scheme for hier-
archical sensor networks. Each node is only preloaded
with one private seed prior to deploy, and the mem-
ory size can be minimal for resource-constrained sensor
nodes. In our method, the revocation of compromised
sensor nodes or cluster heads becomes easier than the
previous schemes which need the operation of rekeying
because each sensor node or cluster head does not pos-
sess the private seeds of its neighbors. The resource-rich
cluster heads are responsible for the management and dis-
tribution of seeds for their members. Our scheme can
defense against the common attacks of wireless networks.
Changing the session key every time can also achieve per-
fect forward secrecy in our scheme. Adversaries can only
intercept and collect the former messages of one cluster,
but they can not decrypt these messages once a certain
sensor node of the cluster is compromised.
Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Acknowledgements
This work was partially supported by the National Science Council, Taiwan,
under contract no. NSC100-2410-H-005-046. The authors also gratefully
acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of the reviewers, which
have improved the presentation.
Author details
1Department of Distribution Management, National Chin-Yi University of
Technology, Taichung, Taiwan. 2Department of Management Information
Systems, National Chung Hsing University, Taichung, Taiwan. 3Department of
Photonics and Communication Engineering, Aisa University, Taichung, Taiwan.
Received: 4 December 2011 Accepted: 6 July 2012
Published: 6 August 2012
References
1. H Chan, A Perrig, D Song, Random key predistribution schemes for sensor
networks. in Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on, Security and
Privacy (The Claremont Resort Oakland, California, USA, 11-14 May 2003),
pp. 197–213
2. M Chorzempa, JM Park, M Eltoweissy, Key management for long-lived
sensor networks in hostile environments. Comput. Commun. 30(9),
1964–1979 (2007)
3. W Du, J Deng, YS Han, PK Varshney, A pairwise key predistribution
scheme for wireless sensor networks. in Proceedings of the 10th ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications (SecurityCCS’03)
(Washington, DC, USA, 27-30 October 2003), pp. 42–51
4. W Du, J Deng, YS Han, PK Varshney, A Khalili, A pairwise key
predistribution scheme for wireless sensor networks. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst.
Secur. 8(2), 228–258 (2005)
Chen et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking 2012, 2012:241 Page 10 of 10
http://jwcn.eurasipjournals.com/content/2012/1/241
5. X Du, Y Xiao, M Guizani, HH Chen, An eﬀective key management scheme
for heterogeneous sensor networks. Ad Hoc Netw. 5(1), 24–34 (2007)
6. M Eltoweissy, H Heydari, L Morales, H Sudborough, Combinatorial
optimizations of group key management. J. Netw Syst. Manage. 12(1),
30–50 (2004)
7. L Eschenauer, VD Gligor, A key management scheme for distributed
sensor networks. in Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communication Security (CCS’02) (New York, NY, USA, 2002), pp. 41–47
8. MF Younis, K Ghumman, M Eltoweissy, Location-aware combinatorial key
management scheme for clustered sensor networks. IEEE Trans. Parallel
Distrib. Syst. 17(8), 865–882 (2006)
9. MY Hsieh, YM Huang, HC Chao, Adaptive security design with malicious
node detection in cluster-based sensor networks. Comput. Commun.
30(11-12), 2385–2400 (2007)
10. D Liu, P Ning, Multilevel μTESLA: broadcast authentication for distributed
sensor networks. ACM Trans. Embed. Comput. Syst. 3(4), 800–836 (2004)
11. A Perrig, R Szewczyk, JD Tygar, V Wen, DE Culler, SPINS: security protocols
for sensor networks. Wirel. Netw. 8(5), 521–534 (2002)
12. WR Heinzelman, A Chandrakasan, H Balakrishnan, Energy-eﬃcient
communication protocol for wireless microsensor networks. in
Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Hawaii International Conference on System
Sciences (HICSS) (Island of Maui, 4-7 January 2000), pp. 3005–3014
13. LB Oliveiraa, A Ferreirac, MA Vilaca, HC Wong, M Bern, R Dahab, AAF
Loureiro, SecLEACH-On the security of clustered sensor networks. Signal
Process. 87(12), 2882–2895 (2007)
14. HF Huang, A novel access control protocol for secure sensor networks.
Comput. Stand. Interfaces. 31(2), 272–276 (2009)
15. Y Zhou, Y Zhang, Y Fang, Access control in wireless sensor networks. Ad
Hoc Netw. 5(1), 3–13 (2007)
16. S Zhu, S Setia, S Jajodia, LEAP+: eﬃcient security mechanisms for
large-scale distributed sensor networks. ACM Trans. Sens. Netw. 2(4),
500–528 (2006)
17. A Shamir, Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. in
Proceeding of the Cryptology-Crypto’84 (Santa Barbara, California, USA,
19-22 August 1984), pp. 47–53
18. M Bellarea, C Namprempre, G Neven, Security proofs for identity-based
identiﬁcation and signature schemes. in Proceeding of the EUROCRYPT’04
(Interlaken, Switzerland, 2-6 May 2004), pp. 268–286
19. CP Schnorr, Eﬃcient signature generation for smart card. J. Cryptol. 4(3),
161–174 (1991)
20. Xi Cao, L Dang, W Kou, B Zhao, IMBAS: identity-based multi-user
broadcast authentication in wireless sensor networks. Comput. Commun.
31(4), 659–667 (2008)
21. Y Zhang, W Liu, Y Fang, D Wu, Secure localization and authentication in
ultra-wideband sensor networks. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 24(4),
829–835 (2006)
22. Y Zhang, W Liu, W Lou, Y Fang, Location-based compromise-tolerant
security mechanisms for wireless sensor networks. IEEE J. Sel. Areas
Commun. 24(2), 247–260 (2006)
23. S Capkun, J-P Hubaux, Secure positioning of wireless devices with
application to sensor networks. in Proceedings of the 24th Annual Joint
Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies, vol. 3
(Miami, FL, USA, 13-17 March 2005), pp. 1917–1928
24. A Savvides, C Han, M Strivastava, Dynamic ﬁne-grained localization in ad
hoc networks of sensors. in Proceedings of the 7th Annual International
Conference onMobile Computing and Networking (Rome, Italy, 2001), pp.
166–179
25. CC Chang, YW Su, IC Lin, A broadcast-encryption-based key management
scheme for dynamic multicast communications. in Proceedings of the 2nd
International Conference on Scalable Information Systems (Suzhou, China,
6-8 June 2007)
26. J Newsome, E Shi, D Song, A Perrig, The sybil attack in sensor networks:
Analysis & defenses. in Proceedings of The 3rd International Symposium on
Information Processing in Sensor Networks (IPSN’04) (Berkeley, California,
USA, 2004), pp. 26–27
27. Y Hu, A Perrig, D Johnson, Packet leashes: a defense against wormhole
attacks in wireless ad hoc networks. in Proceedings of the 22th Annual Joint
Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies, vol. 3 (San
Francisco, CA, 2003), pp. 1976–1986
28. C Karlof, D Wagner, Secure routing in wireless sensor networks: attacks
and countermeasures. Ad Hoc Netw. 1(2), 293–315 (2003)
29. LB Oliveira, HC Wang, AA Loureiro, LHA-SP: Secure protocols for
hierarchical wireless sensor networks. in Proceedings of 9th IFIP/IEEE
International Symposium on Integrated Network Management (Nice, France,
15-19 May 2005), pp. 31–44
30. A Wander, N Gura, H Eberle, V Gupta, S Shantz, Energy analysis of
public-key cryptography for wireless sensor networks. in Proceedings of
the Third IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and
Communications (Kauai Island, HI, USA, 8-12 March 2005), pp. 324–328
doi:10.1186/1687-1499-2012-241
Cite this article as: Chen et al.: Providing perfect forward secrecy for
location-aware wireless sensor networks. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Com-
munications and Networking 2012 2012:241.
Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
